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Abstracts
Articles
A Pluralist Approach to International Law Paul SchiffBerman 301
The New Haven School of International Law offered a significant, process-based
rejoinder to the realism and positivism that had dominated international relations theory in
the United States since the close of World War I. Whereas international relations realists
viewed international law as merely a product of state power relations, and positivists
dismissed international law entirely because it lacked both sovereign commands and a rule
of recognition, scholars of the New Haven School studied law as a social process of
authoritative decisionmaking. Such a study necessarily expanded the state-focused
perspective of both the realists and positivists by drawing attention to ongoing interactions
among variously situated bureaucratic and institutional actors.
Now, in the first decade of the twenty-first century, the gaze has widened still
further, as international law scholars (and those studying law and globalization more
generally) increasingly recognize that we inhabit a world of multiple normative
communities, some of which impose their norms through officially sanctioned coercive
force and formal legal processes, but many of which do not. These norms have varying
degrees of impact, of course, but it has become clear that ignoring such normative
assertions altogether as somehow not "law" is not a useful strategy. Accordingly, what we
see emerging is an approach to international aw drawn from legal pluralism.
As such, this new international law scholarship owes a debt not only to Myres
McDougal, Harold Lasswell, Michael Reisman, and the other practitioners of the New
Haven School, but to another Yale Law School professor whose name is rarely associated
with international law: Robert Cover. This Article discusses Cover's work and its
relationship to the New Haven School of International Law, while arguing that Cover's
emphasis on norm-generating communities-rather than nation-states--along with his
celebration of 'jurisdictional redundancy" provide a useful analytical framework for
understanding the plural normative centers that are the focus of much current international
law scholarship. Moreover, a pluralist perspective on international law provides a
powerful critique to the latest incarnation of realism, now newly dressed up in the
trappings of rational choice theory.
Whose Public, Whose Order?
Imperium, Region, and Normative Friction Christopher J. Borgen 331
This Article, part of an ongoing project by the author on law and hegemony in
Eurasia, considers the strengths and weaknesses of the New Haven School's policy-
oriented jurisprudence in light of the competition among multiple conceptions of "world
public order" that exist today. Taking as its starting point the concept of the world being
divided into "diverse systems of public order," as defined by Harold Lasswell and Myres
McDougal, the Article assesses how this idea of diversity applies to post-Cold War
geopolitics. As a test case, it focuses on Eurasia as a geographic space where multiple
conceptions of public order, including those of the United States, the European Union,
Russia, and Islamic fundamentalism, overlap, interact, and at times compete, especially in
the unstable arc of states bordering Russia.
Part 1I introduces the idea of "diverse systems of public order" described in policy-
oriented jurisprudence. It also situates the New Haven School as part of the liberal
modernist tradition that attempts to find universal norms and/or techniques to address
questions of political or normative conflict. Part III examines the different public orders in
today's multipolar, multinormative world. Part IV proposes the concepts of systemic
borderlands (states that are the geopolitical crossroads between two or more normative
realms) and of normative friction (the process by which competing conceptions of public
order interact in these borderland states) as means of describing normative interactions in
a multipolar world. Part V considers examples of systemic borderlands and normative
friction in Eurasia and, in particular, the recent disputes over the accession of East
European states to the EU and to NA TO and to the ongoing conflicts over the states of the
Black Sea and Caspian Sea regions. Finally, Part VI considers ways in which the New
Haven School can build on some of its own original insights on the existence of diverse
systems of public order in light of changes in international politics and sets out questions
for further investigation.
Rethinking Decisionmaking in International
Environmental Law: A Process-Oriented
Inquiry into Sustainable Development Rebecca M. Bratspies 363
Drawing on insights from the social and behavioral sciences, the New Haven
School of International Law, championed by Harold Lasswell and Myres McDougal,
proposed a worldwide jurisprudence of human dignity. Their process-oriented
jurisprudence attempted to flesh out the core values of human dignity and the processes
necessary to translate those values into universal theories of authoritative decisionmaking.
Of particular interest is the role they proposed for science in legal analysis. This Article
explores the relationship between New Haven School ideas of authoritative decision and
the environmental challenges posed by sustainable development.
In examining the tensions between the malleability of sustainable development as
an international principle on the one hand, and the precision of the multilateral
environmental agreements that shape international environmental law on the other, this
Article identifies how the very idea of an "authoritative decision" is being reshaped in the
context of globalization. In particular, the Article emphasizes how New Haven School ideas
might help make sense of the new multiplicity of decisionmakers in the globalized arena,
and how they might help international environmental law confront the duties owed to
future generations. Using the international debate over cost-benefit versus precautionary
approaches to regulation, this Article tests both the strengths and weaknesses of New
Haven School thinking about science, and draws the conclusion that the lessons offered for
environmental problem-solving are cautionary as well as salutary. While science can
provide useful data for decisionmakers, their process of weighing and acting on those data
is necessarily political and contextual. Ultimately, this Article concludes that, although the
specific scientific matrices and analyses proposed by New Haven School writings are a
product of their times, many of the School's basic insights about the need for contextual,
problem-oriented, and multi-disciplinary analysis still ring true.
Bottom-Up International Lawmaking:
Reflections on the New Haven School of
International Law Janet Koven Levit 393
Many contemporary international legal scholars find themselves besieged by
intellectual and geopolitical currents highly reminiscent of those that influenced the New
Haven School of International Law. Just as the New Haven School answered Cold War,
power-based realism, a new generation of scholars is called upon to answer a neo-
conservative, nationalist ideology that likewise challenges the normative value of
international law. The response-a response indelibly marked by New Haven School
jurisprudence-is to question the naysayers 'foundational assumptions by turning from the
detached, game-theoretic heights of power-based realism to the on-the-ground nuance and
gradation of sociolegal realism.
This Article first isolates three artificial assumptions about the nature of
international law which are at the core of the "nationalist" critique: 1) "states" as
lawmakers; 2) the treaty as the preeminent form of international law; and 3) international
law as a choice--a deliberate process that state elites can orchestrate and control.
The Article then offers three "bottom-up lawmaking" vignettes-export subsidies,
climate change regulation, and corporate social responsibility initiatives-to cast light on
the self-serving simplicity of the nationalists' assumptions. In each instance, a bottom-up
lawmaking process unfolds, featuring private parties, NGOs, sub-state actors, and/or mid-
level technocrats, who coalesce around shared, on-the-ground experiences and perceived
self-interests to solidify norms, which are often intended as a form of self-regulation. Over
time, these informal rules embed in a more formal legal system and harden as law.
Whereas top-down lawmaking-the type of lawmaking at the heart of the nationalist
critique of international law-is a process of law internalized as practice, bottom-up
lawmaking is a subterranean, unchoreographed process of practice externalized as law.
Thus, bottom-up lawmaking empirically exposes the mythical quality of many
international law stories, particularly those flowing from archaic descendants of Cold War
realism. States-and within states, the "political leadership "--are no longer the universe
of international lawmakers; a diverse cast of transnational actors also join the ranks.
These transnational actors parade multiple normative forms in addition to the treaty,
including understandings, informal "'gentlemen's agreements, " pacts, codes, and court
decisions. Finally, international law is not always a matter of deliberate, reflective choice;
international law happens, whether the President or political elites will it or not. Thus,
international lawmaking emerges as a complex, decentralized, and diverse process, a
loosely stitched patchwork of multiple norm-generating communities rather than a
predictably centralized process with the President as the steward. All of these insights
grow from New Haven School seeds, which seem to have taken root and blossomed.
A Law and Geography Perspective on the
New Haven School Hari M Osofsky 421
This Article explores the value of-and barriers to-law and geography approaches
to international legal analysis through the example of the New Haven School of
International Law. It argues that the expulsion of geography from elite U.S. universities
has limited the exposure of current and future generations of international law professors
to the discipline. As a result, despite the centrality of geographic concepts to international
legal problems, scholarly analysis of those ideas tends to be quite thin. The Article calls for
the New Haven School and international legal scholarship more broadly to draw from
geography's interrogation of place, space, and scale.
In making this case, the Article engages in historical and conceptual analysis. First,
the Article looks to the past, providing two different spatio-temporal approaches to an
intellectual history of the barriers to the New Havens School's incorporation of the
discipline of geography. Part II considers the assault on U.S. academic geography in the
mid-to-late twentieth century in the context of developments in legal academia at that time.
It then turns to the evolution of law and geography at Yale more specifically, from the
university's inception through geography's final elimination in 1967. In the process, it
examines possible explanations for the New Haven School's lack of explicit engagement
with the discipline.
Second, the Article focuses on the present and future, analyzing how the current
geography literature might enhance the New Haven School's approach to its geographic
ideas. Part III begins by discussing the geographic ideas consistently articulated in New
Haven School scholarship, with a focus on world community, territorial units, and
authoritative decisionmaking. It then explores how recent geography literature on space,
place, and scale might influence the questions that the New Haven School asks. Finally, it
demonstrates the ways in which the New Haven School's internal and external analyses
might evolve through deeper interrogation of its geographic concepts.
Although the Article primarily advocates for future New Haven School scholarship
to engage the discipline of geography more directly, it also introduces a broader project of
integrating law and geography approaches into international legal analysis. The attack on
geography in tone-setting U.S. universities--and the influence of those eliminations on
law-represents a cautionary tale of the way in which thought develops. Until these elite
institutions embrace geography more fully, the danger of incomplete international
problem-solving will persist.
Normativity in the "New" Schools:
Assessing the Legitimacy of International
Legal Norms Created by Domestic Courts Melissa A. Waters 455
From the building blocks of the New Haven School of International Law, scholars
have developed rich descriptive accounts of the way international law is formed-schools
of thought that can be loosely grouped into those focusing on transgovernmentalism and
those focusing on transnational legal process. To date, however, proponents of those
concepts have shown less interest in exploring the normative implications of their theories.
Most importantly, those theories have not addressed the legitimacy questions that arise
when relevant actors are not necessarily representatives of the state, and when the
emerging legal rules are "softer" and more difficult to identify and apply.
This Article explores the potential of transnational legal process and
transgovernmentalism as normative concepts. It takes as its narrow focus transnational
judicial dialogue among domestic courts, which both transgovernmentalism and
transnational legal process identify as a key vector of transnational lawmaking. However,
that dialogue also presents dificulties from a normative perspective. At worst, its critics
argue, it can create an international countermajoritarian difficulty, in which domestic
courts impose foreign norms on unwilling domestic audiences.
Testing that criticism, this Article returns to John Hart Ely's seminal work on the
domestic countermajoritarian difficulty, Democracy and Distrust. Ely suggests that the
courts' task of removing issues from the political process through constitutional judicial
review can be legitimate, even democracy-enhancing, if it serves to protect discrete and
insular minorities. This Article argues that transnational judicial dialogue may serve an
analogous role: Domestic courts can mediate between the promulgation of international
norms and their internalization to domestic law. As examples, this Article examines two
topical transnational judicial conversations. In the first, both U.S. and foreign courts
construe immigration statutes so as to remain consistent with international human rights
law. In the second, the world's courts shape emerging human rights norms surrounding the
imposition of the death penalty.
Notes
From "See You in Court!" to "See You in
Geneva!": An Empirical Study of the Role of
Social Norms in International Trade Dispute
Resolution Ji Li 485
Are countries with litigious domestic environments more willing to resolve their
disputes with other countries through formal international dispute resolution mechanisms?
Do vague and intangible social norms have any significant impact on a government's
behavior in the international community? If they do, can we distinguish the influence of
social norms from the influence of other factors, such as the level of economic
development, state capacity, and political structure? This Note attempts to answer these
questions by exploring the relationship between domestic levels of litigiousness and a
government's use of the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM). In evaluating the
relationship, I use both quantitative and qualitative methods. Conversations with trade
officials and systemic data analysis reveal a significant positive relationship between
domestic litigiousness and government propensity to file a request for consultation with the
WTO DSM. The findings have several implications. First, the current trend of
judicialization of international affairs may impose disproportionate costs on countries with
non-litigious domestic norms. Second, incorporating normative differences into
institutional design may make transnational dispute resolution mechanisms more effective.
Third, scholars with different disciplinary backgrounds and methodological preferences
will benefit enormously by engaging in the debate of other disciplines and by applying a
diverse set of analytical tools.
Precision War and Responsibility:
Transformational Military Technology and
the Duty of Care Under the Laws of War Dakota S. Rudesill 517
Recent decades have witnessed the American Revolution in Military Affairs
(RMA)-the "Transformation " of the American way of war through synergistic advances
in sensor, communication, precision-strike technology, and related organizational and
operational changes. This Note asks whether technological transformation also transforms
responsibilities under the law of armed conflict (LOA C) and, in particular, whether greater
technological capacity for precision in the use offorce dictates greater legal responsibility
for effects, especially unintended harm to protected persons and property.
In answering in the affirmative, this Note begins in Part II by describing LOAC as
including proscriptive and prescriptive zones, in the latter of which a duty of care is
evident. The legal academic literature generally does not conceptualize responsibility to
obey the law of war in these terms, but Parts III and IV of the Note explain that a duty of
care is evident in LOAC, originating in its jurisprudential, treaty, and customary law
sources. It is also evident in state practice: the ways in which militaries explain LOAC to
their own soldiers. In this respect, this Note seeks to bring the legal academic literature up
to speed with how LOA C is coming to be understood and applied by those in the profession
of arms in the United States and other advanced nations. Combatants are strictly required
to apply this duty of care, while its performance carries what lawyers will recognize as a
negligence standard. Part V explains that responsibility for effects-intended or not-
varies with capacity for control. On a prima facie level, advanced military technology
increases the potential ability of commanders to control the application offorce. In theory,
therefore, a particular harm caused by a technologically advanced military could be the
result of negligence while the same harm caused by a less advanced nation might not.
However, the legal obligation to exert as much control as is reasonably possible
over effects, together with the capabilities of precision technology, cannot add up to a duty
of perfect effects, nor dictate a change to a standard akin to strict liability, due to the
circumstances of war (its timeless nature, implications of the RMA itself and adversary
adaptation) that can significantly offset Transformation 's advantages. Instead, this Note
suggests that, despite their apparent incongruity, fiduciary notions may be a more
appropriate and insightful way to understand the duty of care. The Note concludes by
predicting that duty of care analysis is more likely to inform prosecutions at the state level
rather than in international fora, and by noting that the implicit notion of a duty of care
has migrated internationally in a manner consistent with the transnational norm diffusion
pattern identified by the New Haven School of International Law.

